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SHARING HIMALAYAN GLACIAL
MELTWATER: THE ROLE OF TERRITORIAL
SOVEREIGNTY
ERICA J. THORSON*
INTRODUCTION
Mountain glaciers around the world are melting.1 The
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change and the World Glacier
Monitoring Service both predict that the Andean and Himalayan
glaciers, sources of freshwater for millions of people, will retreat
irreversibly in the coming decades, forever releasing their savings
accounts of freshwater.2 Glacial retreat portends significant global
justice consequences: seventy-seven percent of the world’s freshwater
resources is stored in ice—either in the polar ice caps or mountain
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1. See, e.g., INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE
2007: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION AND VULNERABILITY 493 (2007) [hereinafter CLIMATE CHANGE
2007] (warning that Himalayan glaciers could disappear by 2035 if they continue retreating at
their present rates); UNITED NATIONS ENVIRONMENTAL PROGRAM & WORLD GLACIER
MONITORING SERVICE, GLOBAL GLACIER CHANGES: FACTS AND FIGURES 29 (n.d.),
http://www.grid.unep.ch/glaciers/pdfs/glaciers.pdf [hereinafter GLOBAL GLACIER CHANGES]
(warning that current climate changes could lead to the disappearance of glaciers in many
mountain ranges in the next few decades); WORLD WILDLIFE FUND NEPAL PROGRAM, AN
OVERVIEW OF GLACIERS, GLACIER RETREAT, AND SUBSEQUENT IMPACTS IN NEPAL, INDIA
AND CHINA 1-2 (2005), available at http://assets.panda.org/downloads/himalayaglaciersreport
2005.pdf [hereinafter OVERVIEW OF GLACIERS] (discussing the effects of climate change on
alpine glaciers); David Adam, Water for Millions at Risk as Glaciers Melt Away, THE
GUARDIAN, Oct. 11, 2006, at 13, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/
2006/oct/11/glaciers.travelnews; Richard Black, Water – Another Global “Crisis”?, BBC NEWS,
Feb. 2, 2009, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/nature/7865603.stm (graphing glacier
melt by region, using data collected by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change).
2. WORKING GROUP II TECHNICAL SUPPORT UNIT, INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON
CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE AND WATER 28 (2008), available at http://
www.ipcc.ch/pdf/technical-papers/climate-change-water-en.pdf; GLOBAL GLACIER CHANGES,
supra note 1, at 29.
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glaciers.3 While the polar ice caps store most of the water, mountain
glaciers nonetheless bank a portion that is significant, not just in
quantity but also in accessibility. In light of the extreme freshwater
shortages experts predict, glacial water is of extraordinary value and
4
waste of this resource is to humanity’s peril.
A close examination of the Ganges-Brahmaputra River Basin
highlights starkly the importance of glacial meltwater to the
Himalayan region; it also underscores the complex security concerns
5
and water justice issues so pervasive in Himalayan region politics.
The Ganges-Brahmaputra River Basin significantly depends on
glaciers as a primary source of freshwater, including slightly over
11,000 glaciers resting in Nepal, India, the Tibetan plateau, and
6
Bhutan. The vast majority of these glaciers rest in Chinese territory.
These glaciers supply water for Nepal, India, China, Bhutan, and
Bangladesh.7 Aside from feeding the many rivers and lakes of the
Ganges-Brahmaputra River Basin with year-round fresh water, the
11,000 glaciers comprise 2,571.8 cubic kilometers of ice or 617 cubic

3. The oceans store over 97% of the world’s water; glaciers and ice caps store only 2% of
the total water supply, but 77% of the world’s freshwater. PETER G. KNIGHT, GLACIERS 12
(1999). Although much of this freshwater is locked away in polar ice caps and glaciers, mountain
glaciers account for 0.12% of the world’s freshwater. UNITED NATIONS WORLD WATER
ASSESSMENT PROGRAMME, WATER FOR PEOPLE, WATER FOR LIFE 68 (2003), available at
http://www.unesco.org/water/wwap/wwdr/wwdr1/. In comparison, rivers account for just 0.006%
of the world’s freshwater. Id.
4. OVERVIEW OF GLACIERS, supra note 1, at 3 (estimating that reduced water flows in the
Ganges caused by lost glacial meltwater could lead to water shortages for 500 million people
and 37% of India’s irrigated land).
5. Regarding water conflicts and water security in the region, see generally Surya P.
Subedi, Conclusions and Recommendations, in INTERNATIONAL WATERCOURSES LAW FOR
THE 21ST CENTURY: THE CASE OF THE RIVER GANGES BASIN 247, 247-50 (Surya P. Subedi ed.,
2005) (describing the lack of a cohesive approach to water management in the region and
lamenting the lack of “foresight and wisdom to achieve meaningful cooperation in the area”);
B.C. UPRETI, POLITICS OF HIMALAYAN RIVER WATERS: AN ANALYSIS OF THE RIVER WATER
ISSUES OF NEPAL, INDIA, AND BANGLADESH (1993) (outlining the challenges facing the
Himalayan region regarding multilateral riparian cooperation); Shawkat Alam, An Examination
of the International Environmental Law Governing the Proposed Indian River-Linking Project
and an Appraisal of its Ecological and Socio-Economic Implications for Lower Riparian
Countries, 19 GEO. INT’L. ENVTL. L. REV. 209 (2007) (exploring the conflict between
Bangladesh and India over the proposed project); Salman M.A. Salman & Kishor Uprety,
Hydro-politics in South Asia: A Comparative Analysis of the Mahakali and the Ganges Treaties,
39 NAT. RESOURCES J. 295 (1999) (discussing the water politics of India, Nepal, and
Bangladesh).
6. MAP OF GLACIER RESOURCES IN THE HIMALAYAS 7-1-7-7 (Qin Dahe ed., 1999).
7. Id. at 7-1.
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miles of frozen water—water that scientists predict the glaciers will
8
soon release.
Although artificially inducing the retreat of glaciers may not be
ecologically or climatologically wise, the Himalayan region
nonetheless has an interest in storing glacial meltwater that
9
represents the amount of glacial melt in excess of historic levels.
First, the region is heavily reliant on the Himalayan rivers for much of
its freshwater needs, including sanitation, drinking water, agricultural
and industrial development, and hydroelectricity.10 Thus, diversion
and storage of the water is a rational choice—it would allow the
11
region to maximize the beneficial uses of the water. Second,
diversion and storage would forestall the potentially catastrophic
consequences of glacial melt, such as glacial lake outburst floods and
sea-level rise, which threaten many low-lying States—in particular
Bangladesh, a country that depends on Himalayan glacial meltwater
as a main freshwater source.12
The States most well-positioned, inclined, and capable of water
storage projects of such tremendous capacity are likely to be the
8. Id.
9. While the supply of water will initially increase with rising temperatures, as frozen
water storage melts away, these supplies will disappear, too. XU JIANCHU ET AL., THE MELTING
HIMALAYAS: REGIONAL CHALLENGES AND LOCAL IMPACTS OF CLIMATE CHANGE ON
MOUNTAIN ECOSYSTEMS AND LIVELIHOODS 7 (2007). Combined with population growth and
increased water consumption, climate change could lead to calamitous water shortages in the
region by 2050. Id.
10. BHIM SUBBA, HIMALAYAN WATERS: PROMISE AND POTENTIAL PROBLEMS AND
POLITICS 87 (2001) (explaining the uses and stresses on water resources in the region); see also
OVERVIEW OF GLACIERS, supra note 1, at 4 (discussing the consequences of decreased water
flows in Nepal); Sumit Ganguly & Manjeet S. Pardesi, India Rising: What is New Delhi to Do?,
24 WORLD POL’Y J. 9, 14 (2007) (describing India’s current water challenges).
11. SUBBA, supra note 10, at 171 (identifying possible uses of stored water).
12. While the plains face the threat of an increase the frequency and severity of floods
caused by glacial melt, the more serious threats are in the mountains. OVERVIEW OF GLACIERS,
supra note 1, at 3-4. As glaciers retreat, they leave behind depressions and moraine deposits,
where glacial lakes can form. These lakes are prone to bursting; the resulting glacial lake
outburst flood (GLOF) carries with it not just water but also moraine deposits, wreaking havoc
on downstream communities and infrastructure. Id. For a detailed explanation of GLOFs, see
MICHAEL HAMBREY & JÜRG ALEAN, GLACIERS 253-69 (2d ed. 2004). See also SAMJWAL
RATNA BAJRACHARYA, PRADEEP KUMAR MOOL & BASANTA RAJ SHRESTHA, IMPACT OF
CLIMATE CHANGE ON HIMALAYAN GLACIERS AND GLACIAL LAKES: CASE STUDIES ON
GLOF AND ASSOCIATED HAZARDS IN NEPAL AND BHUTAN 3-4 (2007) available at
http://books.icimod.org/index.php/downloads/publication/169 (recounting past GLOFs in the
region). Sea level rise carries with it many hazards, including increased flooding, coastal erosion,
and increased salinization of groundwater supplies. INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON
CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: SYNTHESIS REPORT 48-49 (2007) available at
http://www.ipcc.ch/ipccreports/ar4-syr.htm [hereinafter SYNTHESIS REPORT 2007].
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wealthier upper riparian States.13 This raises a number of interesting
and important questions: Does the water, and all rights to benefit
from the water, belong to the upper riparian States where the glaciers
currently rest? Or, because the glacial meltwater would otherwise run
its course through an interconnected, transboundary water system, do
lower riparian States also have rights vis-à-vis that glacial meltwater?
Unless international law, either customary or treaty, provides
downstream or otherwise interconnected States with rights vis-à-vis
glacial meltwater and, conversely, imposes duties on upper riparian
States, downstream States are at the mercy of seasonal rivers, lakes,
and aquifers.
This brief article begins to explore the theoretical underpinnings
of the law of non-navigational uses of international watercourses in
light of the imminent significance of glaciers as controversial
international natural resources. This article critically assesses the
scope of the law, specifically whether the Himalayan glaciers that feed
the major river basins of the region are included within the scope of
the law. Specific substantive rights and duties aside, consideration of
whether the law is adequate in scope is germane to understanding
whether the law of international watercourses is a good framework
under which States should deliberate and cooperate regarding glacial
meltwater issues.
Part I of this article describes the basic glacier formation and
decay processes and the characteristics that give glaciers an
international dimension. Part II considers the foundational propertybased tenets of the law of international watercourses, emphasizing the
role of territorial sovereignty, even as a limited territorial sovereignty
approach currently reigns. Part III examines whether mountain
glaciers that exhibit certain international characteristics are subject to
international watercourse law. The article concludes that the precept
of territorial sovereignty heavily influences our current understanding
of the law of international watercourses, and leads to a restricted
scope of the law. Thus, as currently understood, the law of nonnavigational uses of international watercourses engenders an
insufficient identification of important international glaciers and

13. China accounts for almost half of all large dams in the world, with over 22,000; India
also ranks in the top five, with over 4,000. WORLD COMMISSION ON DAMS, DAMS AND
DEVELOPMENT: A NEW FRAMEWORK FOR DECISION-MAKING 9 (2000) available at
http://www.dams.org/report/. In contrast, just 1% of irrigation water in Nepal and Bangladesh
comes from dams. Id. at 13.
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therefore likely fails to provide an adequate framework for redressing
the concerns of downstream States, such as Bangladesh.
I. BACKGROUND ON GLACIERS
A. Basic Overview of Glaciers
Glaciers form from highly compacted snow, often at the base of
14
mountains. When snow falls at a greater rate than it melts, a portion
of the snow remains throughout the year.15 Then, when new snow
falls, it densely packs the snow remaining on the ground, hardening
16
and insulating it. As this process repeats itself over a series of years,
the base layers of snow transform into ice and form a glacier.17
As glaciers age, they grow and retreat simultaneously. Glaciers
melt throughout the year, even as snow accumulates. In summer,
warmer air temperatures and solar radiation melt the surface of the
glaciers, while the pressure of amassing ice and geothermal activity
cause the base of the glacier to melt even in winter.18 Melting glacial
ice moves through the glacier in several ways. Some of this melting
ice travels unobstructed to the glacier’s snout through surface
streams, internal channels, and along the glacier bed.19 In other cases,
snow and ice dams temporarily trap some water either on the surface
of the glacier, within the glacier, or along the glacier bed, storing it
until the dam breaks.20 Other water remains in deep slush at the edge
21
of the glacier and in the ground beneath the glacier.
This complex drainage system makes tracking glacial meltwater
22
difficult. As global temperatures rise and glaciers melt faster, this
meltwater will become increasingly important. Initially, glacial retreat
is likely to flood riverbeds with water as more water than the glaciers
otherwise supply is released; following that, however, the absence of
the glaciers portends dry river beds except as rain or snowfall may

14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

SUBBA, supra note 10, at 42-43.
Id. at 42.
HAMBREY & ALEAN, supra note 12, at 25-27.
Id.
SUBBA, supra note 10, at 46-47.
HAMBREY & ALEAN, supra note 12, at 122.
KNIGHT, supra note 3, at 95-96.
Id.
See HAMBREY & ALEAN, supra note 12, at 127.
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supply water.23 This means less freshwater storage, more potentially
catastrophic floods from glacial lakes, and economic losses from
24
industries reliant on a constant supply of water.
B. The International Nature of Glaciers
Those glaciers that may be considered international and their
meltwater can be generally thought of in two categories for legal
purposes—transboundary glaciers, those that straddle international
borders, and glaciers that exist entirely within a single State’s
territory. Either of these types of glaciers could be an international
glacier. First, a glacier and its meltwater may be transboundary either
because the glacier itself straddles an international boundary or
because its meltwater traverses one or more international borders.
The Siachen glacier is an example of the former scenario. Five of the
six largest glaciers outside of the polar regions reside in the
Karakoram Range, which spans Pakistan, India and China.25 The
largest of these glaciers, the Siachen Glacier, is seventy-five
kilometers long, stretches over 450 square kilometers, and extends
across the border between India and Pakistan.26 In fact, the Siachen
glacier may be a harbinger of what is to come—India and Pakistan
have been warring over this territory since 1984, but not necessarily
out of concern for freshwater resources.27 Although the Siachen
glacier feeds the Indus River, which is indisputedly a transboundary
28
river, one could imagine a scenario in which a transboundary glacier

23. See generally INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE
CHANGE 2001: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION, AND VULNERABILITY 208-09 (2001); OVERVIEW OF
GLACIERS, supra note 1, at 3; Fred Pearce, Flooded Out, NEW SCIENTIST, June 5, 1999.
24. OVERVIEW OF GLACIERS, supra note 1, at 3-4 (enumerating adverse consequences of
glacial melt).
25. SUBBA, supra note 10, at 45.
26. Id.
27. See Neal A. Kemkar, Environmental Peacemaking: Ending Conflict Between India and
Pakistan on the Siachen Glacier Through the Creation of a Transboundary Peace Park, 25 STAN.
ENVTL. L.J. 67, 77-78 (2006). This territorial dispute dates back to partition, when India and
Pakistan agreed on a cease-fire line up to the glacier, leaving the status of the glacier itself
unclear. Id. at 75-76. However, India claims ownership over the territory in part because the
glacier is the source of the Nubra River, which flows through India before joining the Indus. See
id. at 77. See also Tim McGirk with Avarind Adiga, War at the Top of the World, TIMEASIA,
May 4, 2005, available at http://www.time.com/time/asia/covers/501050711/story.html (reviewing
the history of the dispute and the current situation).
28. Kemkar, supra note 27, at 77.
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did not feed an international water body, instead melting into a
29
confined, subglacial lake.
As an example of the latter scenario, a glacier wholly within the
sovereign territory of one State could melt in such a way as to create a
glacial lake that crosses an international border, or such a glacier
could melt and feed a shared aquifer, giving the glacier’s meltwater an
30
international, transboundary character. These situations clearly give
rise to an international water resource because it is clearly established
that a water resource that either traverses or carves an international
31
border is an internationalized water resource. Additionally, a glacier
that rests wholly within the sovereign territory of a single State may
feed a river or lake as part of a watershed that extends beyond a
32
single State’s borders. Many glaciers feed rivers in neighboring
countries, giving them an indisputably international character. For
example, the East, Central and West Rongbuk Glaciers at the base of
Mount Everest in Tibet flow into the Rong River, which then flows
into Nepal’s Arun River.33 Tibet’s Pumori Glacier also flows to the
Arun River via the Rong River, while the Kangshung Glacier drains
34
into the Arun through the Kama River. As these examples
demonstrate, it is easy to conjure examples of glacial water exhibiting
some international character.
III. THE EVOLVING ROLE OF TERRITORIAL
SOVEREIGNTY IN INTERNATIONAL WATERCOURSE LAW
International watercourse law is predicated on a number of
property-based theories that give rise to varying degrees of rights and
obligations, all based on the concept of territorial sovereignty, which
provides States the exclusive right to use the land, water, and other
29. On subglacial lakes generally, see generally HAMBREY & ALEAN, supra note 12, at 21,
118, 153-57.
30. See, e.g., KNIGHT, supra note 3, at 93-122 (explaining the structure and drainage of
glaciers).
31. The United Nations Convention on the Non-Navigational Uses of International
Watercourses, G.A. Res. 51/229, U.N. Doc. A/RES/51/229 (May 21, 1996) (defining an
international watercourse as “a watercourse, parts of which are situated in different states). See,
e.g., ILC, Commentary, Draft Articles on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International
Watercourses, ¶ 222, pt. 1, art. 2(a), commentary (2) (“The most common examples [of
international watercourses] would be a river or stream that forms or crosses a boundary, or a
lake through which a boundary passes.”).
32. See supra notes 18-24 and accompanying text.
33. ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA ONLINE, MOUNT EVEREST (2009), http://www.search.eb.
com/eb/print?articleId=108438&fullArticle=true&tocId=9108438.
34. Id.
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resources found within its borders. These theories include absolute
territorial sovereignty, absolute territorial integrity, and limited
territorial sovereignty—all variations on the degree to which a State
must consider the transboundary effects of its use of its water
resources. This section explores the role of territorial sovereignty in
international watercourse law by defining the different theoretical
approaches that States’ have used to negotiate and argue the
parameters of international watercourse law. It concludes that limited
territorial sovereignty is properly seen as a move away from absolute
territorial sovereignty, but that the core concept of territorial
sovereignty remains influential and dominant in defining the
parameters of international watercourse law.
A. Absolute Territorial Sovereignty
The doctrine of absolute territorial sovereignty provides that
States have exclusive sovereignty over their territory and that this
soverignty is unfettered by the interests of any other State, meaning
that a State may exploit natural resources situated in its territory to
the extent desired, regardless of any transboundary consequences.35
Perhaps the earliest, the most direct, and the most famous articulation
of absolute territorial sovereignty is then U.S. Attorney General
Judson Harmon’s assertion that the United States did not owe to
Mexico a duty to desist its diversions of water from the Rio Grande
so that Mexico could also enjoy the use of the river’s waters.36
Harmon rooted his property argument in three tenets of
international law. First, that States enjoy sovereignty within its
territory is axiomatic. Second, he based his argument on a longerstanding theory of jurisdiction that suggests that in the absence of an
international or bilateral agreement, States are free to act in their best
37
interests within their territory. Third, in articulating the doctrine,

35. STEPHEN C. MCCAFFREY, THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL WATERCOURSES 77 (Oxford
Univ. Press 2007) (defining the Harmon Doctrine).
36. Judson Harmon, Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo—International Law, 21 OP. ATT’Y GEN.
274 (Dec. 12, 1895). The theory is also known as the Harmon Doctrine. See MCCAFFREY,
INTERNATIONAL WATERCOURSES, supra note 35, at 77 (noting that the Harmon Doctrine is
“virtually synonymous” with absolute territorial sovereignty). See generally id. at 76-110.
37. See MCCAFFREY, INTERNATIONAL WATERCOURSES, supra note 35, at 69 (defining
“territoriality” and describing jurisdictional consequences); see also OPPENHEIM’S
INTERNATIONAL LAW 384, § 118 (Sir Robert Jennings & Sir Arthur Watts eds., 9th ed. 1992).
As evidence for this theory, Harmon relied on general principles of law relating to jurisdiction,
citing the United States Supreme Court decision Schooner Exchange v. McFadden, 7 Cranch

THORSON_FMT2.DOC

2009]

5/7/2009 2:45:26 PM

SHARING HIMALAYAN GLACIAL MELTWATER

495

Harmon relied on the idea that States may take action in the pursuit
of self-preservation, though the concept of self-preservation is more
accurately thought of as an excuse for taking a particular action
rather than providing a right to take any action.38
In important ways, however, these tenets are misapplied in the
shared river context, and Harmon is not viewed as having expressed
the customary law of the time.39 Indeed, absolute territorial
sovereignty still does not reflect customary law.40 Perhaps most
significant, no State prior to Harmon’s assertion had identified
absolute territorial sovereignty as a reason or justification for
exploiting water resources to the detriment of a downstream
riparian.41 However, despite States’ general unwillingness to justify
downstream implications on the grounds of absolute territorial
sovereignty, States continue to assert their right to territorial
sovereignty as a bedrock principle of international water law, often
initiating negotiations and excusing participation in regional and
bilateral agreements with reference to territorial sovereignty.42 In this
way, even though absolute territorial sovereignty is not customary

116, 136, for the proposition that States enjoyed exclusive sovereignty. In that case, the Supreme
Court noted that
The jurisdiction of the nation within its own territory is necessarily exclusive and
absolute. It is susceptible of no limitation not imposed by itself . . . All exceptions,
therefore, to the full and complete power of a nation within its own territories must be
traced up to the consent of the nation itself.
Harmon, supra note 36, at 281-82 (citing Schooner Exchange, supra).
38. OPPENHEIM, supra note 37, at 426-27 (defining the concept of self-preservation).
39. See Stephen C. McCaffrey, Water, Water Everywhere, But Too Few Drops to Drink:
The Coming Fresh Water Crisis and International Environmental Law, 28 DEN. J. INT’L. L. &
POL’Y 325, 327 (asserting that “Harmon’s conclusions were not supported, much less compelled,
by the law as it existed at the time”).
40. See generally Stephen C. McCaffrey, The Harmon Doctrine One Hundred Years Later:
Buried, Not Praised, 36 NAT. RESOURCES J. 549 (1996) (arguing that the Harmon Doctrine
should not be international law).
41. See MCCAFFREY, INTERNATIONAL WATERCOURSES, supra note 35, at 113 (suggesting
that while often asserted, states have seldom put the idea of absolute territorial sovereignty into
practice); Jerome Lipper, Equitable Utilization, in THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL DRAINAGE
BASINS 15, 23 (Garretson et al. eds., 1967) (“Research has disclosed no evidence that the
Harmon Doctrine was ever applied to contiguous rivers.”). In fact, years after the United States
had staked its claim to the waters of the Rio Grande based on its assertion of absolute territorial
sovereignty, it renounced the doctrine, suggesting that the U.S. State Department had
considered the recitation of what is now known as the Harmon Doctrine an obtusely biased
position statement. See Joseph W. Dellapenna, The Customary International Law of
Transboundary Fresh Waters, 1 INT’L. J. GLOBAL ENVTL. ISSUES 264, 270 (2001) (suggesting
that the Harmon Doctrine did not reflect State practice).
42. See id. at 269 (noting that upper riparian States invariably begin negotiations by taking
note of absolute territorial sovereignty).
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international law, it is a powerful negotiating position, and it holds
powerful political sway in international fora. Absolute territorial
sovereignty remains an important and influential underlying principle
in international water law.
B. Absolute Territorial Integrity
The principle of absolute territorial integrity provides that an
upstream State may not undertake an activity that would affect the
43
natural flow of water to the downstream State. Some scholars and
downstream States, suggest that the right to absolute territorial
integrity provides downstream States with a veto power over the
activities of upper riparian States, but the notion that absolute
territorial integrity provides veto authority is generally not accepted.44
Nonetheless, like upper riparian States, lower riparian States push
absolute territorial integrity more as a negotiating tool than as
customary law.45 In fact, the substantive results of negotiated
compromises between upper and lower riparian States suggest the
erosion of the absoluteness of both principles, bridging the schism
with a mitigated version of both—the principle of limited territorial
sovereignty.46
C. Limited Territorial Sovereignty
Limited territorial sovereignty represents the fundamental
substantive underpinning of international water law, and, in fact, it is
47
widely viewed as customary international law. Built on compromise
and middle ground, it attempts to meld the rights-based theories of
absolute territorial sovereignty and absolute territorial integrity into a
holistic, integrated framework through an expression of rights

43. See LIPPER, supra note 41, at 18 (relating territorial integrity to the common law
concept of private water rights).
44. Id. (noting that no evidence supports the notion of territorial integrity resolving a
dispute between coriparians, either in a tribunal or diplomatic settlement).
45. Dellapenna, supra note 41, at 269 (“Downstream states . . . generally open
[negotiations] by claiming a right to the ‘absolute integrity of the watercourse.’”).
46. See MCCAFFREY, INTERNATIONAL WATERCOURSES, supra note 35, at 131-32
(concluding that neither absolute territorial sovereignty nor absolute territorial integrity are
truly “absolute” in practice).
47. See LIPPER, supra note 41, at 38 (concluding, after thorough analysis of State practice,
decisions of international panels and courts, and the writings of commentators and publicists,
that limited territorial sovereignty “is a rule of international law”); see also MCCAFFREY, supra
note 35, at 135 (noting that limited territorial sovereignty is “the prevailing theory of
international watercourse rights and obligations today”).
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coupled with an acknowledgement of duties.48 The concept of limited
territorial sovereignty is substantively interpreted as the right of
territorial sovereignty and the corollary duty not to cause significant
harm to the sovereign rights of other States.49
While some scholars might argue that the birth of this principle
represents a clear abdication of the principle of absolute territorial
sovereignty, this principle hardly entirely renounces territorial
sovereignty.50 In fact, instead of integrating the concepts of territorial
sovereignty and integrity, articulations of limited territorial
sovereignty merely juxtapose the right to territorial sovereignty and
the duty to protect the territorial integrity of other States.51 It is thus
an abdication only of the extent of the right, not the right itself. The
history of the law of international watercourses has evolved based on
assertions of rights and negotiating positions, which, over time, has
meant that expressions of rights have always subjugated the
expression of duties—this is entirely evident in various iterations of
“limited territorial sovereignty.”52 In most articulations of this
principle, the right of territorial sovereignty remains influential and
dominant, whereas the duty not to cause harm is more measured. In
fact, it is never defined as simply the duty not to cause harm; at best,

48. See James O. Moermond III & Erickson Shirley, Critical Essay: A Survey of the
International Law of Rivers, 16 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 139, 145 (1987-1988) (noting the
hybrid nature of limited territorial sovereignty).
49. See LIPPER, supra note 41, at 25 (describing early articulations of the limited territorial
sovereignty doctrine, including France’s position in its arbitration with Spain over withdrawals
from Lake Lanoux, wherein France asserted “the sovereignty in its own territory” but also
recognized “the correlative duty not to injure the interests of a neighboring State”); see also
MCCAFFREY, supra note 35, at 135 (summarizing the principle of limited territorial sovereignty
as territorial sovereignty confined by the duty not to cause significant harm to other States).
50. See, e.g., Dante A. Caponera, Patterns of Cooperation in International Water Law:
Principles and Institutions, 25 NAT. RESOURCES J. 563, 568 (1985) (suggesting that the principles
of reasonableness and equity, hallmark substantive beacons of limited territorial sovereignty,
“mark the rejection” of absolute territorial sovereignty).
51. Although not solely applicable to freshwater resources, Principle 21 of the Stockholm
Declaration espouses an analogous principle. Principle 21 identifies in clear terms the nature of
the juxtaposition:
States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of
international law, the sovereign right to exploit their own resources pursuant to their
own environmental policies, and the responsibility to ensure that activities within their
jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of other States or of
areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.
Stockholm Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment
Principle 21, June 16, 1972, 11 I.L.M. 1416.
52. See supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text, describing assertions of rights as
negotiating positions, rather any acknowledgment or even allegation of duties.
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it is articulated as the duty not to cause appreciable harm and
53
sometimes even the duty not to cause significant harm.
Because limited territorial sovereignty softens the substantive
impact of absolute territorial sovereignty, rather than extinguishing
the rights inherent in the principle of absolute territorial sovereignty,
54
territorial sovereignty remains germane to international water law.
This is an important distinction for both the substance of the law and
the scope of the law. As noted above, substantively, limited territorial
sovereignty portends a definite deference to territorial sovereignty in
its recognition that some level of harm to downstream States may be
perfectly acceptable.55 Thus, while no longer “absolute,” the concept
of territorial sovereignty remains a significant justification and basis
for State action. In terms of scope, States’ protection of their
territorial sovereignty is likely a limitation on implementation of
limited territorial sovereignty because upper riparian States, out of
concern for their sovereign and exclusive right to the water situated in
or flowing through their territory, are resistant to consent to
agreements wherein substantive rights and duties are based on a
limited territorial sovereignty paradigm.56 In this way, many upper
riparian States are not party to freshwater management agreements
and therefore, the scope of those agreements only includes a portion

53. See G.A. Res. 51/229, supra note 31, art. 7 (stating “Watercourse States shall, in
utilizing an international watercourse in their territories, take all appropriate measures to
prevent the causing of significant harm to other watercourse States”). When the ILC first
presented its draft articles to the United Nations General Assembly, Article 7 was titled
“Obligation not to cause appreciable harm.” International Law Commission, Draft Articles on
the Law of Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses: Draft Report of the
International Law Commission, U.N. GAOR, 43rd Sess., at 1, UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.463/Add/4
(1991). For a thorough discussion of the draft articles, see generally INTERNATIONAL WATER
LAW: SELECTED WRITINGS OF CHARLES B. BOURNE (Patricia Wouters ed., 1997).
54. See LIPPER, supra note 41, at 33 (concluding that limited territorial sovereignty requires
that states, in exercising their sovereignty, also consider their neighbors’ concerns).
55. See MCCAFFREY, INTERNATIONAL WATERCOURSES, supra note 35, at 135 (explaining
limited territorial sovereignty as an obligation not to cause significant harm). See Lake Lanoux
Arbitration (Fr. v. Spain), 24 I.L.R. 101, 124 (Arbitral Trib. 1957) (taking note that Spain
conceded France’s right to use water in French territory as long as it caused only a “limited
amount of damage, a minimum of inconvenience” to Spain).
56. See R.R. Baxter, The Indus Basin, in THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL DRAINAGE
BASINS 452-58 (A.H. Garreston et al. eds., 1967). During a stalemate over the development of
the Indus River, India held strong to its belief that India and Pakistan had “full and exclusive
jurisdiction over the management, control and utilisation of natural waters available in their
territories. Id. at 456. It was only when the two parties agreed temporarily to put legal
considerations aside and allow both parties to withdraw water from the river while the parties
negotiated that the stalemate was broken. Id. at 458.
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of the relevant watercourse.57 Thus, while limited territorial
sovereignty may be the prevailing legal theory in the development of
58
international water law, States’ protection of territorial sovereignty
remains a limitation on the territorial expanse in which upper riparian
States are willing to accept the duties flowing from a limited
territorial sovereignty approach.59
III. INTERNATIONAL GLACIERS AND THE SCOPE OF THE
LAW OF INTERNATIONAL WATERCOURSES
To ascertain whether any rights or duties exist vis-à-vis glaciers
and their meltwater, it is first imperative to examine the status of
glaciers in international law and thus the scope of international
watercourse law. Throughout the last century, the law of international
watercourses has expanded to recognize that many more freshwater
bodies than just transboundary rivers, lakes, and aquifers are
sufficiently interconnected to warrant status under international law.
Thus, after a historical examination of the scope of transboundary
water resource law, this section turns to consider the evolution of the
concept of “watercourse” as it is currently embodied in the 1997 UN
Convention. This section concludes that, while the Convention
includes a broad definition of its scope, the influence of territorial
sovereignty has meant that the 1997 UN Convention is not customary
international law and that it is unlikely to enter into force in its own
right. This ultimately means that the law of non-navigational uses of
international watercourses excludes many important international
glaciers.
A. Transboundary Freshwater Bodies
Transboundary freshwater bodies—those freshwater bodies
bisected by at least one international boundary—have long been
exposed to the balance of rights and duties comprising international

57. See infra Part III.A.
58. Moermond & Erickson, supra note 48, at 145 (citing a number of scholars for the
proposition that limited territorial sovereignty is generally accepted as international law).
59. See, e.g., Agreement on the Cooperation for the Sustainable Development of the
Mekong River Basin, Apr. 5, 1995, 34 I.L.M. 864 (China and Burma, both upper riparians, failed
to join this agreement on the development and use of the Mekong waters) [hereinafter Mekong
Agreement]; Agreement for the Full Utilization of the Nile Waters, Nov. 8, 1959, Sudan-Egypt,
453 U.N.T.S. 6519 (Egypt and Sudan allocated all of the waters of the Nile between themselves,
without including the eight riparian States above them).
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law.60 Early agreements reflect an understanding among co-riparians
that cooperation was necessary for the most effective utilization of
the major rivers that gave birth to early civilizations, such as the Nile
and the Tigris-Euphrates, and the major rivers of the Himalayan
61
region, such as the Indus, Yangtze, and Yellow rivers. But, while the
earliest known water agreement resulted in an upstream diversion for
agricultural purposes, controversies over non-navigational uses of
shared water bodies arose much less frequently than disputes
between upper and lower riparian States regarding the right to
passage.62 Thus, agreements, disagreements, and pronouncements
concerning the navigational uses of transboundary waters really gave
rise to modern international water law, but the role of territorial
sovereignty can be seen most clearly as the law evolved to include the
63
non-navigational uses of transboundary waters.
Historical State practice regarding the navigational uses of
shared freshwater bodies suggests that navigable rivers have long
60. See generally MCCAFFREY, INTERNATIONAL WATERCOURSES, supra note 35, at 58-64
(providing general history of the development of bilateral and regional cooperative agreements
regarding water resources, including for both non-navigational and navigational purposes); see
also Dellapenna, supra note 41, at 269-73 (examining the status of shared management of
transboundary resources as customary international law). See also id. at 34 (noting that
“[h]istorically, and indeed until very recently, [S]tate practice in the field of international
watercourses was concerned almost exclusively with international rivers and lakes shared by two
or more [S]tates”); see also Gabriel Eckstein, Development of International Water Law and the
UN Watercourse Convention, in HYDROPOLITICS IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD: A SOUTHERN
AFRICAN PERSPECTIVE 81-82 (Turton & Henwood eds., 2002) (highlighting that the principle
sic utere tuo ut alienam non laedus is a longstanding principle of international water law first
applied in cases of transboundary waters) [hereinafter Eckstein, Development of International
Water Law).
61. See MCCAFFREY, INTERNATIONAL WATERCOURSES, supra note 35, at 58 (describing
the nature of early civilizations to develop along major river courses and of these civilizations’
need to cooperate in support of agricultural development).
62. Id. at 181 (asserting that the demand of water resources for non-navigational purposes
was far less controversial; instead, navigation disputes were more influential in shaping the
nascent law of international watercourses); see also Eckstein, Development of International
Water Law, supra note 59, at 82 (indicating that as early civilizations took root and grew,
navigation became the dominant use of transboundary waterways and that international law on
non-navigational uses only took shape as industrialization increased pressure on transboundary
waterbodies).
63. MCCAFFREY, INTERNATIONAL WATERCOURSES, supra note 35, at 172-73
(highlighting that the earliest agreement in a compilation of water agreements relates to
freedom to navigate the Rhine); see also Cecil J. Olmstead, Introduction, in THE LAW OF
INTERNATIONAL DRAINAGE BASINS 3 (Garretson et al. eds., 1967) (stating that some states are
reluctant to concede that international law is applicable to the whole of a drainage basin and
that such reservations “probably [stem] in part from traditional notions of national
sovereignty,” which have taken on greater significance as water value increases in the face of
competing non-navigational uses).
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been perceived as shared resources, subject to the navigation rights of
64
all riparian States. Early declarations of such navigation rights have
their basis in Roman law, which provided that rivers were public
resources and that all citizens retained the freedom of navigation.65
For example, when Thomas Jefferson argued that the United States
enjoyed freedom of navigation on the lower Mississippi, parts of
which were subject to Spanish sovereignty, he reinforced his assertion
with a reminder of a central tenet of Roman law: that rivers are
rooted in nature and are open to all citizens for navigation (flumina
publica sunt, hoc est populi Romani).66 Importantly, Jefferson only
claimed navigation rights to a clear transboundary waterbody—the
Mississippi at that time crossed from the sovereign territory of the
United States to the sovereign territory of Spain—and one to which
67
the United States was riparian. Spain ultimately agreed with the
United States and averred as such by treaty.68
The dynamic between Spain and the United States reflects the
historical and current understanding of co-riparian States—it is clear
that co-riparian States, for the most part, have formed relationships
based on an understanding that they each have a commensurate right
69
to freedom of navigation of transboundary watercourses. The
decision of the Permanent Court of Justice in the River Oder decision
70
confirmed the nature of these relationships. The Court identified a
64. See MCCAFFREY, INTERNATIONAL WATERCOURSES, supra note 35, at 172 (describing
early state practice).
65. See Ludwik A. Teclaff, Fiat or Custom: The Checkered Development of International
Water Law, 31 NAT. RESOURCES J. 45, 46 (1991) (tracing the history of navigation and noting
that the Roman Republic first introduced the concept of freedom of navigation). Prior to the
Roman doctrine, riparian tribes, cities, and local rules controlled navigation, which they viewed
as a privilege deserving of reciprocal benefit. Id.
66. See MCCAFFREY, INTERNATIONAL WATERCOURSES, supra note 35, at 181-82 (stating
that Jefferson’s invocation of Roman law reflected the general understanding of legal scholars
at the time).
67. Id. at 181.
68. Id. at 182. The Kingdom of Spain formally granted the United States liberty to navigate
the Spain’s stretches of the Mississippi in Article IV of the treaty of October 27, 1975. Id.
69. See generally id. at 183-84 (identifying a number of bilateral and regional agreements
following on Jefferson’s report to George Washington and a similar proclamation by the
Provisional Executive Council of the French Republic stating that river-courses are common to
all riparian States and therefore all riparian States enjoy inalienable freedoms vis-à-vis shared
rivers).
70. The River Oder Decision resolved a dispute between Poland, on the one hand, and the
six other members of the International Commission of the Oder over the navigational rights on
the tributaries of the Oder. Territorial Jurisdiction of the International Commission of the River
Oder, (Czech., Den., Fr., F.R.G., Gr. Br., Swed. and Pol.) 1929 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 23, at 5-6
(Sept. 10). The two tributaries at issue, the Warta and Notec, rise in Poland and flow a
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“common legal right” extending navigation rights to the whole of a
71
navigable watercourse.
Over time, States have also come to accept that they share rights
and duties vis-à-vis co-riparian States as a matter of customary
international law, even as regards non-navigational uses of clear
transboundary resources. In the Gab ikovo-Nagymoros decision, the
International Court of Justice affirmed that Hungary and
Czechoslovakia each had an equal right to the benefits of the
Danube’s water resources, including the use of the water for
hydropower, recreational enjoyment, fisheries, and other benefits,
because the Danube lies contiguous to both Hungary and
Czechoslovakia for a portion of its path and traverses the border of
72
each. In arriving at this conclusion, the Court noted that both
Hungary and Czechoslovakia enjoyed a customary right “to an
equitable and reasonable sharing of the resources of an international
watercourse.”73 Thus, the case reinforces that transboundary
considerable distance through Poland, eventually crossing into Germany before joining the
Oder in Germany. Id. at 25. Poland argued that these tributaries should be internationalized
only “from [their] confluence with the Oder up to the Polish frontier,” retaining complete
sovereignty over waters from those rivers within their territory. Id. at 14. The other members
disagreed, contending that all navigable sections of the river should be internationalized,
regardless of state boundaries. Id. The Court agreed, explaining that the purpose of
internationalizing rivers was to provide freedom of navigation to all states, not just to riparian
states. See id. at 28. Thus, the Court concluded that the Polish tributaries were internationalized
as far as navigable. Id. at 29. See id. at 27 (holding that the common right of navigation extends
to “the whole course of the river”).
71. The Court, by way of discussing the principle of navigation as it applied to downstream
States seeking to navigate upstream tributaries situated wholly within sovereign territories, took
note that:
[W]hen consideration is given to the manner in which States have regarded the
concrete situations arising out of the fact that a single waterway traverses or separates
the territory of more than one State, and the possibility of fulfilling the requirements
of justice and the considerations of utility which this fact places in relief, it is at once
seen that a solution of the problem has been sought not in the idea of a right of passage
in favour of upstream States, but in that of a community of interest of riparian States.
This community of interest in a navigable river becomes the basis of a common legal
right, the essential features of which are the perfect equality of all riparian States in the
use of the whole course of the river and the exclusion of any preferential privilege of
any one riparian State in relation to the others.
Id. at 27. The International Court of Justice Case concerning the Gabčikovo-Nagymoros project
further develops the theory of community interest, relying on it to suggest that Czechoslovakia,
by unilaterally acting without regard to the Danube River’s shared nature, deprived Hungary of
its right to its share of the water resources. Gabčikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.),
1997 I.C.J. 7, ¶ 85 (Sept. 25) [hereinafter Gabčikovo-Nagymoros]. On the “community of
interests” theory generally, see Lipper, supra note 41, at 38-40. See also MCCAFFREY,
INTERNATIONAL WATERCOURSES, supra note 35, at 147-67.
72. See Gabčikovo-Nagymoros, supra note 71, at ¶ 85.
73. Id. ¶ 78.
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waterbodies are subject to the rights and duties of customary
international law.
Transboundary lakes, rivers, and aquifers ineluctably fall within
the scope of international law. Thus, transboundary glaciers and
transboundary meltwater, such as glacial lakes or streams that
traverse an international border, are direct analogues of
transboundary rivers, lakes, and aquifers, they most likely also fall
well within the scope of the law of international watercourses.
Therefore, even if a specific treaty does not apply to a particular
transboundary glacier, the customs and principles of international
water law apply. But neither treaty practice nor international
adjudication nor arbitration exists specifically as to glaciers, and thus
customs and principles have not been applied in glacier-related
contexts. Moreover, very few glaciers actually traverse international
borders and most are less directly connected to a transboundary
waterbody, meaning that the more salient concern is whether
international water law also encapsulates all physically
interconnected waters and water sources.
B. Beyond a Transboundary Approach?
The notion that transboundary waterbodies are international
resources, to which co-riparian States each have rights and duties is
74
widely accepted. However, questions remain, given concerns about
territorial sovereignty, whether the scope of international law
includes non-navigational uses of sovereign tributaries of
international waterbodies and, more importantly, sub-tributaries and
other less directly connected elements of a water system. The arbitral
decision in the Lac Lanoux makes clear that international water law
does consider hydrologic relationships and that this understanding
has been folded into the scope of international watercourse law
because the case concerns diversions from a lake wholly within

74. The United Nations Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) lists over 2,000
international legal instruments relating to water resources, mostly in the form of bilateral
agreements. MCCAFFREY, INTERNATIONAL WATERCOURSES, supra note 35, at 62. Based on
member states’ responses to the Secretary General’s questionnaire regarding the laws and
legislation in force in member states, the Secretary General noted that many of the national
laws treated water as a “natural resource which should be utilized for the common good.” The
Secretary General, Supplementary Report Submitted by the Secretary-General Pursuant to
General Assembly Resolution 2669 (XXV), Legal Problems Relating to the Non-Navigational
Uses of International Watercourses, The Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International
Watercourses, U.N. DOC. A/CN.4/274 (1974), reprinted in [1974] 1(2) Y.B. INT’L L. COMM’N 265,
272, ¶ 13.
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France’s territory but that feeds rivers traveling through Spain.75 What
is less clear is the extent of this understanding, or rather the extent to
which water resources that lie wholly within the sovereign territory of
one State are subject to international law when the
interconnectedness is more attenuated than an immediate physical
relationship to some transboundary freshwater resource.76
1. The Lac Lanoux Arbitration
The Lac Lanoux arbitration is the starting point for examining
the status of sovereign waterbodies interconnected to international
river systems. Lac Lanoux is situated entirely within the borders of
France in the Eastern Pyrenees.77 The lake feeds two river basins, one
that drains into Spain by way of the Font-Vivre and Carol rivers and
one that travels through France via the Ariège and Garonne rivers.78
In 1950, France proposed to divert water from Lac Lanoux for the
79
purpose of generating hydropower. Spain took offense to this
because it would affect the flow of the Carol river, which crosses the
border from France into Spain.80 After some negotiation, France
agreed that it would replenish water to the Carol via a manmade
diversion, thus ensuring that the flow of the Carol remained
consistent with historical levels.81 Nonetheless, Spain opposed any
diversion on the grounds that it would “modif[y] the natural
82
conditions of the hydrographic basin” and, relatedly, that France
could not undertake such a project without arranging a prior
83
agreement with Spain.
75. Lake Lanoux Arbitration, supra note 55, at 101-02. For a discussion of that Arbitration,
see infra notes 76-85 and accompanying text.
76. See, e.g., Comments and Observations Received from Governments: General
Comments of Costa Rica, The Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses,
in documents of its forty-fifth session, [1993] II (1) Y.B. INT’L L. COMM’N 145, 151, ¶ 9, U.N.
DOC. A/CN.4/447 and Add.1-3 (questioning whether “the circumstance of [a river] crossing a
small part of the territory of a neighbouring State and flowing into its waters [would] be
sufficient to qualify that entire river or tributary as an ‘international watercourse’”).
77. Lake Lanoux Arbitration, supra note 55, at 101.
78. Id. at 101-02.
79. See id. at 107. The subject of diverting waters from Lac Lanoux first arose in 1917, and
was the subject of dialogue between Spain and France until 1930, when world events took
precedence. In 1949, the two countries renewed their dialogue; in 1950, a French hydropower
company applied for, and was granted, a concession from the French Government to divert
waters from Lac Lanoux to the River Ariege. Id. at 105-07.
80. Id. at 112.
81. Id. at 109-10.
82. Id. at 124.
83. Id. at 113-14.
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In addressing these issues, the arbitral tribunal implicitly spoke
to the extent of international water law. The panel recognized, by way
of background, prior to arriving at any substantive conclusions, that
the waters of Lac Lanoux, though wholly situated within the
sovereign territory of France, are nonetheless an element of an
international water system because of the interconnectedness of the
lake and at least one transboundary river system.84 The panel pointed
out that “there is a rule prohibiting the upper riparian State from
altering the waters of a river in circumstances calculated to do serious
injury to the lower riparian State.”85 By so stating, the Panel
confirmed that the customary international water law regarding nonnavigational uses includes within its scope lakes and other
waterbodies that, though wholly situated within a sovereign territory,
86
feed an international watercourse.
In this regard, the arbitral panel made no distinction among
waterbodies directly connected to transboundary rivers and those that
are less directly connected, but the facts of the dispute did not cause
the panel to delve any deeper into the matter of the scope of
87
international law. To say that this decision wholly endorses a watersystem approach is an overstatement, but it does begin to lay the
groundwork for a broader approach to international water law.88 In
fact, following this decision, the International Law Association, took
up codification and development of the law of international water
resources and promoted a drainage basin approach to defining the
scope of international water law.
2. The Helsinki Rules
The Helsinki Rules on the Uses of Waters of International
Rivers, adopted by the International Law Association (ILA) in 1966
84. Id. at 125 (“The Tribunal does not overlook the reality, from the point of view of
physical geography, of each river basin, which constitutes . . . a ‘unit.’”).
85. Id. at 129.
86. See John G. Laylin & Rinaldo L. Bianchi, The Role of Adjudication in the International
River Disputes, 53 AM. J. INT’L L. 30, 43-45 (1959) (explaining the Tribunal’s decision to limit
France’s sovereignty over international rivers and lakes in certain instances).
87. See J.G. LAMMERS, POLLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL WATERCOURSES 516-17 (1984)
(noting that the Tribunal simply applied the principle of good neighborliness to the riparian
context).
88. “The unity of a basin is sanctioned at the juridical level only to the extent that it
corresponds to human realities.” Lake Lanoux Arbitration, supra note 55, at 125. See Samuel A.
Bleicher, An Overview of International Environmental Regulation, 2 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 25-27
(1972) (noting that although France prevailed, it did not have unfettered discretion in its use of
waters from Lake Lanoux).
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as one of the earliest attempts at codifying the emerging international
law governing the uses of transboundary rivers, identifies the rules
89
pertaining to “international drainage basins.” An international
drainage basin is more than simply a transboundary river, it is the
90
entire geographic area of a watershed. The definition identifies the
limits of any given watershed as a water system, comprising both the
surface and ground waters and co-terminating at a single point of
91
outflow. The rules thus contemplate a broad understanding of the
freshwater resources subject to international water law. In fact, under
this theory, even a wholly sovereign tributary to a transboundary
river attains international status despite it lacking a transboundary
nature of its own.92 Or, a domestic lake, if interconnected through
surface waters or even groundwaters to a watershed spanning an
international border, falls within the purview of international law as

89. International Law Association, Helsinki Rules on the Uses of the Waters of International
Rivers, 52 INT’L L. ASS’N REP. CONF. 484, 484 (1966) [hereinafter Helsinki Rules]. The Helsinki
Rules have been superseded by the Berlin Rules, adopted in 2004, but the Helsinki Rules
remain the more authoritative and widely recognized set of rules. International Law
Association, Berlin Rules on Water Resources, 71 INT’L L. ASS’N REP. CONF. 334, 343 (2004),
available at http://www.ila-hq.org/download.cfm/docid/B6F3AD1C-11B5-45A389534097AD1FE
E95.
90. Helsinki Rules, supra note 89, art. 2 cmt. b at 485 (elaborating on the elements of a
basin).
91. Art. 2 provides that “[a]n international drainage basin is a geographical area extending
over two or more States determined by the watershed limits of the system of waters, including
surface and underground waters, flowing into a common terminus.” Id. at 484-85. See Stephen
C. McCaffrey, International Organizations and the Holistic Approach to Water Problems, 31
NAT. RESOURCES J. 139, 141-44 (1991) [hereinafter McCaffrey, Holistic Approach] (explaining
the scope of an international drainage basin); Teclaff, supra note 65 at 68-69 (briefly discussing
the foundation of the Helsinki Rules); Gabriel Eckstein, A Hydrogeological Perspective of the
Status of Ground Water Resources Under the UN Watercourse Convention, 30 COLUM. J. ENVTL
L. 525, 533-35 (2005) (acknowledging that some countries objected to the breadth of the term
drainage basin and it was ultimately not incorporated in the 1997 UN Convention). See also
Joseph W. Dellapenna, Designing the Legal Structures of Water Management Needed to Fulfill
the Israeli-Palestinian Declaration of Principles, 7 PALESTINE Y.B. INT’L L. 63, 80 (1992-1994)
(noting that the Helsinki Rules, while significant, have only persuasive value in international
law); Joseph W. Dellapenna, The Customary International Law of Transboundary Fresh Waters,
1 INT.’L J. GLOBAL ENVTL. ISSUES 264, 273-74 (2001) (commenting on the remarkable influence
of the ILA as a non-governmental organization).
92. Helsinki Rules, supra note 89, art. 3 cmt. at 486 (including in its definition of basin state
“all States whose territories contribute waters to the international drainage basin, whether or
not ‘riparian’”). See McCaffrey, Holistic Approach, supra note 91, at 143 (“[T]he rules of
international law stated by the Helsinki Rules apply not only to the main stem of a river, or to
portions of a stream forming a boundary, but to tributaries of an international watercourse as
well.”).
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articulated by the ILA.93 In either case, according to the Helsinki
rules, any interconnected fresh water composing the drainage basin,
no matter how far removed from a transboundary resource, is subject
to international water law.
3. The 1997 United Nations Convention on Non-navigational
Uses of International Watercourses
While the ILA conducted its work, the International Law
Commission (ILC), established in 1948 by the United Nations
Charter and charged with the codification and progressive
development of international law, embarked on a mission to codify
the law of international rivers.94 This effort, initiated in 1970,
culminated in the 1997 Convention on the Non-Navigational Uses of
International Watercourses (1997 UN Convention).95 While most of
the Convention’s substantive prescriptions are considered customary
international law, the scope of the Convention remains highly
contentious, in large part as a result of upper riparian States’
reluctance to cede any sovereignty to the interests of lower riparian
States.96
Turkey expressed the sentiment and fears of upper riparian
States when, during the debate of the draft articles at the UN General
Assembly, it stated that “the term ‘watercourse system’ has also been

93. Helsinki Rules, supra note 89, art. 3 cmt. at 486 (“recogni[zing] . . . that underground
waters may flow from a State without reaching the surface in its territory into the territory of
other States in an international drainage basin where they contribute substantially to the surface
flow”).
94. Article 13(1)(a) of the Charter of the United Nations provides the authority for the
United Nations General Assembly to convene a Commission dedicated to the codification and
progression of international law. See U.N. Charter art. 13, para. 1a. The United Nations General
Assembly convened the Commission on December 11, 1946 during the second half of its first
meeting. See G.A. Res. 94(I), at 187 (Dec. 11, 1946), available at http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/
RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/033/45/IMG/NR003345.pdf?OpenElement.
The
Commission
comprises 34 international law scholars, serving five-year terms. See United Nations,
International Law Commission, http://www.un.org/law/ilc/ (last visited Feb. 10, 2009).
95. United Nations, Resolution 2669 (XXV) (Dec. 8, 1970) (providing terms of reference
for Commission’s study of the law of the non-navigational uses of international watercourses),
available at http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/349/34/IMG/NR034934.
pdf?OpenElement (last visited Feb. 11, 2009). The ILC produced a set of draft Articles in 1991
and a second draft in 1994, after which the General Assembly instructed the Commission to pull
together a draft convention for the member governments’ consideration. Draft Articles, supra
note 53; International Law Commission, Draft Articles on the Law of Non-Navigational Uses of
International Watercourses, in Report of the 46th Meeting of the International Law Commission,
UN Doc. A/49/10 (1994); United Nations Convention on the Law of Non-Navigational Use of
International Watercourses, UN Doc. No. A. 51/869 (May 21, 1997).
96. See infra Part III.C.
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given too broad a meaning. This term includes glaciers, canals and,
especially, underground waters, and naturally leads to the sharing of
97
these resources.” Turkey posited that defining the scope of the
treaty so broadly would unacceptably infringe the permanent
sovereignty that States retain over the natural resources situated
within their territory.98 Despite States’ objections, the ILC
nonetheless moved forward with a broad definition, though it did
99
reject the ILA’s drainage basin approach.

97. Comments and Observations Received from Governments: General Comments of
Turkey, The Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses, in documents of
its forty-fifth session, [1993] II (1) Y.B. INT’L L. COMM’N 145, 168, ¶ 5, U.N. DOC. A/CN.4/447
and Add.1-3 [hereinafter Comments of Turkey]. The debate over the proper definition of an
international watercourse extended over two and a half decades. See James L. Wescoat, Jr.,
Beyond the River Basin: The Changing Geography of International Water Problems and
International Watercourse Law, 3 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 301, 304 (1992) (tracing the
evolution of the term “watercourse” in the 1997 UN Convention).
98. In discussions over the scope of waters included in the 1997 U.N. Convention, Turkey
expressed its preference for a narrow scope, arguing that otherwise the result “would be
inconsistent with the generally accepted principle of international law concerning the
permanent sovereignty of States over their own natural resources.” Turkey further stated that it
would only give its approval if the scope of the draft articles was limited in scope to surface
waters. See Comments of Turkey, supra note 97, at 168, ¶ 5.
99. The contentious nature of defining the scope of the Convention is evidenced by the fact
that the ILC took up the scope as one of its last items, after nearly 23 years of debate. See
Stephen C. McCaffrey, Special Rapporteur, Seventh Report on the Law of the Non-Navigational
Uses of International Watercourses, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/436/Corr. 1-3 (Mar. 15, 1991); see also
McCaffrey, Holistic Approach, supra note 91, at 153 (noting that the general lack of agreement
regarding the definition of the term “watercourse” forestalled further pursuit of the matter at
the outset of the ILC’s work). For a discussion of the ILC’s work on the scope of the
Convention, see Margaret J. Vick, International Water Law and Sovereignty: A Discussion of the
ILC Draft Articles on the Law of Transboundary Aquifers, 21 PAC. MCGEORGE GLOBAL BUS.
& DEV. L. J. 191, 196-97 (2008). In 1980, the ILC agreed to a framework understanding of
“watercourse” based on the idea that each watercourse is a system of interconnected waters and
provided the following explanation of its understanding:
A watercourse system is formed of hydrographic components such as rivers, lakes,
canals, glaciers, and groundwater constituting by virtue of their physical relationship a
unitary whole; thus, any use affecting waters in one part of the system may affect
waters in another part.
An “international watercourse system” is a watercourse system, components of which
are situated in two or more States.
To the extent that parts of the waters in one State are not affected by or so not affect
uses of waters in another State, they shall not be treated as being included in the
international watercourse system. Thus, to the extent that the uses of the waters of the
system have an effect on one another, to that extent the system in international, but
only to that extent; accordingly, there is not an absolute, but a relative, international
character of the watercourse.
International Law Commission, Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International
Watercourses, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.316 (July 17, 1980), available at http:// untreaty.un.org/
ilc/documentation/english/a_cn4_1316.pdf.
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Despite the ILC’s rejection of the ILA’s use of “drainage basin”
to define “watercourse,” the ILC still conceptually rejected the
international river as forming the sole basis of the international law of
watercourses.100 The 1997 UN Convention defines “watercourse”
functionally the same as the ILA, stating that a watercourse is a
system of surface and groundwaters that are physically
interconnected and that usually co-terminate.101 Significantly, the 1997
UN Convention defines an international watercourse as “a
102
watercourse, parts of which are situated in different States.”
This definition is broad and encompasses all interconnected
waters, including rivers, tributaries, lakes, glaciers, aquifers,
103
reservoirs, and canals. An international watercourse exists when
any portion, whether a tributary, lake, or other surface waterbody
receives water from or contributes water to another State.104 Mountain
glaciers indisputably function as part of a water system when they
supply rivers, lakes, and aquifers with water, and thus, these glaciers
are encapsulated by the broad definition espoused by the 1997 UN
Convention. Consequently, if a mountain glacier is physically
connected to a water system that meets the requirements of the 1997
UN Convention, then certain rights and duties would apply to the use

100. Many upper riparian States favored the “international river” approach taken in the
Final Act of the Congress of Vienna in 1815, which would have limited the scope of the ILC’s
work to rivers that either separate or traverse at least two States. See McCaffrey, Holistic
Approach, supra note 91, at 152 (analyzing the responses of governments to a questionnaire on
setting the scope of the ILC’s work).
101. See 1997 UN Convention, supra note 31, art. 2(a) (“‘Watercourse’ means a system of
surface waters and groundwaters constituting by virtue of their physical relationship a unitary
whole and normally flowing into a common terminus.”); see also MCCAFFREY,
INTERNATIONAL WATERCOURSES, supra note 35, at 37 (noting that the distinction between an
international drainage basin and a watercourse system, at least legally, is merely of historical
interest because “the concept of the drainage basin is functionally equivalent—at least
hydrologically—to that of the watercourse system”).
102. See 1997 UN Convention, supra note 31, art. 2(b) (“‘International watercourse’ means
a watercourse, parts of which are situated in different States.”).
103. See MCCAFFREY, INTERNATIONAL WATERCOURSES, supra note 35, at 35 (pointing out
that “watercourse” as defined by the International Law Commission in the 1997 UN
Convention includes “rivers and their tributaries, lakes, aquifers, glaciers, reservoirs and
canals”). One of the Special Rapporteurs appointed by the International Law Commission,
Stephen McCaffrey has stated in remarks, “[The 1997 UN Convention’s definition of
“watercourse”] covers not only the boundary river or successive river, but also lakes and other
surface waters that may be shared. It applies to a tributary or any other component or
subtributaries that may be involved.” Stephen C. McCaffrey, The Non-Navigational Uses of
International Watercourses (Remarks), 84 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 228, 233 (1990).
104. See MCCAFFREY, INTERNATIONAL WATERCOURSES, supra note 35, at 41.
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of that glacier.105 This is true whether the glacier itself is
transboundary or whether it resides solely in sovereign territory.
C. The Watercourse Approach as Customary International Law
The 1997 UN Convention proffers an expansive scope of
applicability—one that likely provides downstream States rights vis-àvis glacial meltwater stored in upstream States, but these rights are
only salient if either the Convention enters into force and all relevant
States are party or the Convention’s expansive watercourse approach
represents customary international law.106 While many of the
substantive provisions of the Convention are likely considered
customary law, upper riparian States have a good argument for the
claim that the scope of the customary law of international
watercourses is not as geographically and hydrologically inclusive in
its breadth as the 1997 UN Convention.107 At the very least, many
upper riparian States, especially China, may argue that they are
persistent objectors and that, therefore, if the 1997 UN Convention’s
watercourse approach is customary law, it does not apply to them.
This section examines these arguments, focusing particularly on State
practice in the Himalayan region.
State reaction to the 1997 UN Convention is evidence of State
practice, and, generally, upper riparian States reacted negatively to
adoption of the Convention. In fact, few States have ratified the
treaty, and far fewer have ratified than is needed for it to enter into
force—only sixteen States have submitted their ratifications, and the
treaty requires thirty-five ratifications to enter into force.108 Although
a number of upper riparian States have ratified the treaty, these

105. These rights and duties include equitable and reasonable utilization and participation,
1997 UN Convention, supra note 31, art. 5, obligation not to cause significant harm, id. art. 7,
and information exchange and notification, id. art. 9-19.
106. See BOLESLAW A. BOCZEK, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A DICTIONARY 30 (2005)
(explaining the complementary nature of customary law and treaty law).
107. See infra notes 108-117 and accompanying text.
108. See 1997 UN Convention, supra note 31, art. 36(1) (“The present Convention shall
enter into force on the ninetieth day following the date of deposit of the thirty-fifth instrument
of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession with the Secretary-General of the United
Nations.”); United Nations Treaty Collection, Databases, Multilateral Treaties Deposited with
the Secretary-General, Status of Treaties, Chapter XXVII(12), http://treaties.un.org/ Pages/
ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&id=530&chapter=27&lang=en#1 (indicating that sixteen
States have signed the Convention and sixteen have ratified it) (last visited Feb. 10, 2009)
[hereinafter UNTC Database]. Those States that have ratified the Convention are Finland,
Germany, Hungary, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Namibia, Netherlands,
Norway, Portugal, Qatar, South Africa, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, and Uzbekistan. Id.
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States are also all lower riparian States with respect to major rivers.109
Of these, only two primarily upper riparian States have ratified the
treaty—South Africa and Uzbekistan, both of which have
considerable interests to protect as lower riparian States as well.110
111
None of the Himalayan States have signed or ratified the treaty.
Moreover, many States, including India and Pakistan, abstained from
voting on the Convention during the General Assembly debate,
112
evincing suspicion and general disregard of the treaty. Many of the
113
States that abstained are upper riparian States. Three States voted
against it—again, all upper riparian States in major international river
114
basins and, importantly, China was one of these States. In addition,
prior to drafting the treaty, the ILC surveyed governments as to
whether it should use a drainage basin concept to identify the scope
of the treaty.115 Of the upriver or upper riparian States that
responded, most eschewed the drainage basin concept, favoring
instead the concept of “international river.”116 On the other hand,
lower riparian States responded mostly favorably to a drainage basin
117
concept. This schism in responses and the low ratification yield of
109. See UNTC Database, supra note 108; Eckstein, Development of International Water
Law, supra note 59, at 91-96 (detailing states’ status as either upper or lower riparian or both).
110. See Eckstein, Development of International Water Law, supra note 59, at 93, 94 (noting
that South Africa and Uzbekistan are mostly upper riparian States); see also Central
Intelligence Agency, World Factbook, Uzbekistan, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/theworld-factbook/geos/uz.html (last visited Feb. 13, 2008) (showing map of Uzbekistan’s two
major rivers, the Amu Darya and Syr Darya, which originate in Tajikistan and Kyrgystan
respectively); Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations, Irrigation Potential in
Africa: A Basin Approach (1997), http://www.fao.org/docrep/W4347E/w4347e0q.htm (last
visited Feb. 13, 2009) (identifying Lesotho as the upper Riparian State vis-à-vis the Orange
River).
111. UNTC Database, supra note 108.
112. UNITED NATIONS, YEARBOOK OF THE UNITED NATIONS 1997, at 1343 (1997). Nepal
and Bangladesh voted in favor of the Convention. Id.
113. See Eckstein, Development of International Water Law, supra note 60, at 91-96
(identifying upper versus lower riparian States voting in favor and abstaining from the vote to
adopt the Convention).
114. UNITED NATIONS, supra note 111.
115. When the ILC began its deliberations, it started by circulating a questionnaire to
member States inquiring whether it should employ the ILA’s drainage basin concept as a
parameter for its work. See Report of the International Law Commission to the General
Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/9610/Rev.l (1974), reprinted in [1974] 2 Y.B. INT’L L. COMM’N 302, U.N.
Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1974/Add.l.; see also McCaffrey, International Organizations, supra note
91, at 151-52 (detailing the history of the ILC’s work).
116. Of the twenty-five States that originally responded to the questionnaire, half expressed
opposition to incorporation of the international drainage basin concept, leading the Special
Rapporteur to eschew that terminology. Id. at 152.
117. Id.

THORSON_FMT2.DOC

512

DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW

5/7/2009 2:45:26 PM

[Vol 19:487

the treaty suggests that the watercourse approach is not widely
accepted and that it is not customary international law.
State practice in the Himalayan region further supports upper
riparian States’ arguments that the glaciers are not subject to the
118
Of the
rights and duties of international watercourse law.
agreements that pertain to the waters of the region, only two manage
river basins in any sort of comprehensive way; however, even these
agreements underscore the role of territorial sovereignty.119 The
Mekong River Agreement defines its scope expansively, relying on an
ecosystem approach, but China, wherein the headwaters of the
Mekong originate, refuses to ratify the agreement and only
participates in management negotiations and problem-solving as an
120
observer. The Indus River Agreement between Pakistan and India
also identifies a broad scope of application including all tributaries
and all connecting lakes of the Indus, Jhelum, Chenab, Ravi, Beas,
and Sutlej Rivers, but the substantive provisions of the treaty apply
variously to different tributaries and all tributaries that originate in
Pakistan and flow only through Pakistani territory are excluded from
any substantive impact.121
118. This section takes a particular look at state practice in the Himalayan region for two
reasons: This Article is specifically concerned with the glaciers and glacial meltwater
distribution of the Himalayan region, and ascertaining the customary law as it pertains to
glaciers requires an examination of state practice vis-à-vis glaciers—the Himalayan region
represents the most significant multi-State, glacier dependent region.
119. See Indus Waters Treaty, Sep. 19, 1960, 419 U.N.T.S. 126, (including in its scope all
tributaries that eventually join the main river, even if they flow only intermittently); Mekong
Agreement, supra note 59 (addressing not just the water but also the surrounding environment).
See also Agreement on Sharing of the Ganges’ Waters, Bangl.-India, Nov. 5, 1977, 1066
U.N.T.S. 16 (regulating the waters of the Ganges at Farrakka Barrage, just east of the IndiaBangladesh border); Amended Agreement Between His Majesty’s Government of Nepal and
the Government of India on the Kosi Project, India-Nepal, Dec. 19, 1966, reprinted in Subedi,
supra note 5, at 253 (agreeing to construct a hydroelectric dam for mutual benefit and adjusting
the water allocation accordingly); Agreement Between His Majesty’s Government of Nepal and
the Government of India on the Gandak Irrigation and Power Project, India-Nepal, Dec. 4,
1959, reprinted in Subedi, supra note 5, at 262 (cooperatively managing the construction and use
of a dam on the Gandak River); Treaty between His Majesty's Government of Nepal and the
Government of India concerning the Integrated Development of the Mahakali River, IndiaNepal, Feb. 12, 1996, 36 I.L.M. 531, reprinted in Subedi, supra note 5, at 267 (allocating water
between Nepal and India on the Mahakali River).
120. Mekong Agreement, supra note 59. For a discussion of China’s interests in the Mekong
River, see L. Waldron Davis, Reversing the Flow: International Law and Chinese Hydropower
Development on the Headwaters of the Mekong River, 19 N.Y. INT’L L. REV. 1 (2006).
121. See generally Indus Waters Treaty, supra note 119. The Indus Waters Treaty is the
upshot of long negotiations among India, Pakistan, and the International Bank of
Reconstruction and Development. For more on the political history of the negotiations, see
Baxter, supra note 57.
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Thus, although some precedent exists for managing rivers and
interconnected waters, the majority of the agreements in the region
are simply agreements for the construction and running of dams in
the context of a singular international river—evidence that the States
in the region do not see themselves as legally obliged to multilaterally
manage entire water systems, including glaciers, as single entities.122
This assertion is buttressed by the fact that no State in the region has
ratified any regional or bilateral water agreements since the adoption
of the 1997 UN Convention.123 In addition, China has roundly refused
to ratify any water agreements, whether bilateral, regional, or
124
international.
Moreover, that the responses to the 1997 UN Convention, as well
as State treaty practice, split so clearly along lower riparian versus
upper riparian lines is meaningful. It evinces a strong underlying
current of territorial sovereignty and territorial integrity. No State
that has within it valuable natural resources wants to subsume its
liberty to act according to its best interest to the interest of any other
State that may be affected. Thus, while limited territorial sovereignty
may be the prevailing substantive theory, it has never been applied
comprehensively to an entire physically interconnected water
system—either because upper riparian States declined to enter into
comprehensive management regimes or because the agreements that
do bring upper riparian States to the table include compromises and
major concessions to upper riparian States’ interests, usually by
limiting the geographic scope of the agreement. Generally, upper
riparian States disfavor internationalizing freshwater resources
outside of a limited radius of a transboundary waterbody, and, in this
way, territorial sovereignty remains the dominant limiting factor in
defining the scope of international water law.
122. See Subedi, supra note 5, at 248 (“Unlike the regional or sub-regional arrangements
that exist in other parts of the world with regard to the shared international watercourses of the
region, there is no sub-regional, regional or basin-wide approach adopted in these treaties to the
broader water or environmental problems facing [India, Nepal, and Bangladesh].”).
123. The Mekong Agreement is the most recent, entering into force in 1995. See Mekong
River Commission Secretariat, Mekong River Commission, http://www.mrcmekong.org/ (last
visited Feb. 13, 2009) (detailing history of the Commission).
124. See Alex Liebman, Trickle-down Hegemony? China’s “Peaceful Rise” and Dam
Building on the Mekong, 27 CONTEMP. SOUTHEAST ASIA 281, 290, 299 (2005) (concluding that
China’s costs are many upon signing water management agreements with lower riparian States);
Eric W. Sievers, Transboundary Jurisdiction and Watercourse Law: China, Kazakhstan, and the
Irtysh, 37 TEX. INT'L L.J. 1, 31 (2002) (noting that despite repeated efforts by Russia and
Kazakhstan to compose a general agreement of cooperation on the Irtysh River, China failed to
sign).
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CONCLUSION: GLACIERS IN CONTEXT
This approach is problematic when it is applied to glaciers. While
some glaciers, such as the Siachen glacier that traverses both India
and Pakistan, are transboundary in the most straightforward sense of
term, other glaciers are wholly within sovereign territories but
nonetheless
international
because
of
some
physical
interconnectedness to a transboundary freshwater resource.
Moreover, many glaciers connected to watersheds feed headwaters of
rivers that are connected only distantly from a mainstem water
resource. These glaciers are not clearly subject to the law of
international watercourses. They would be if the 1997 UN
Convention actually reflected customary international law, but State
practice does not seem to support the 1997 UN Convention’s
approach to the scope of international watercourse law.
As such, States may argue forcefully, based on territorial
sovereignty, that many international glaciers are not subject to the
customary law of international watercourses and will rely on this
argument to forestall regional and bilateral agreements that promote
cooperative sharing and distribution of the waters’ benefits based on
parity and comity. If States, such as China, are not clearly the subject
of a set of rights and duties designed to foster cooperation, then in the
absence of agreements otherwise, such States, are likely to
aggressively exploit glacial meltwater and arguably are not subject to
a duty to share or cooperate in the exploitation of the these glaciers’
meltwater.
In this way, water justice in the Himalayan region requires a new
way of thinking about shared water resources. The current model,
reflected in State practice and reluctance to endorse the 1997 UN
Convention’s broad definition of “watercourse,” is inadequate to
foster true water accord in the region.

